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1. Introduction
Spatial concentration of economic activities is one of the most salient features of economic
development. The almost parallel urge by policymakers to counteract such a trend through public
polices is also striking. This is not only reserved to those countries, especially in Europe, which have
a long tradition of public intervention. To a lesser extent, the United States has (for example during
the New Deal period) put into place policies aimed at correcting uneven patterns of regional
development. Public intervention is usually defended on either efficiency or equity grounds. In the
case of economic geography, a justification in terms of efficiency implies identifying the various
market failures, specific to the issue of space, that make the optimal economic geography differ
from the one induced solely by market forces. Although one also needs to show that public
intervention will make a better job than market forces, the identification of market failures is a
necessary first step to justify public intervention on efficiency grounds. Whereas this type of analysis
has been standard for public intervention in the fields of education, technology, pollution, etc., the
counterpart for regional policies is much less developed. There are two ways forward: the first is to
analyse how some “standard” market failures are modified by the introduction of space and
distance and how in turn, this should affect the definition of public policies; the second is to
understand how space and distance themselves can be at the origin of market failures. 
Another way to justify public intervention is to do it on equity grounds. Some economic agents,
workers and consumers, are not mobile and are stuck in poor or declining regions, regions from
which mobile factors, some labour and capital, have left. Because of the lower demand for labour
in those regions, real wages will either adjust downwards or if real wages cannot adjust due to
rigidities on the labour market, unemployment will increase. As consumers, these agents will also
see their welfare decrease because some of the goods and services formally produced locally will
be produced in the core, richer region. In this case, they will either have to pay a higher price for
those goods and services because of the transaction cost involved in importing them from the rich
region. In some cases, in particular for services, the transaction cost will become so high that they
will become non-tradable so that the diversity of available services will decrease. Also, if the mobile
agents are those with the highest human capital and if positive spillovers exist between workers due
to localised social interactions, then as mobile agents move away from the poor region, immobile
workers will also lose the benefits of these positive spillovers which may imply a decrease in their
productivity and therefore in their equilibrium wage. One can say that the root of this problem is
then the lack of concentration and the lack of mobility of agents rather than concentration itself. This
is partially right and we want to analyse some policy implications of this interpretation. However,
one could not go too far along this road because some economic agents will always remain
immobile so that the equity motive behind regional policies remains. This raises the question
whether regional policies are best equipped to deal with this issue and how to co-ordinate them
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with other redistributive policies. Finally, we want to analyse how regional policies affect economic
geography and regional inequalities. One important difficulty is that these policies, due to the very
nature of the self-sustaining agglomeration forces at work in economic geography, have extremely
complex long-term effects.
2. Searching for market failures in economic geography
E x t e rnalities are the best  friend of an economist who  wants to defend  public intervention,  and
regional  policies  are  no  exception.  Both  t e c h n o l o g i c a l and  p e c u n i a r y e x t e rnalities  can  be  put
f o rw a rd in the case of economic geography because physical space has a strong impact on both.
The first category occurs when there are technological spillovers that are spatially localised. Several
reasons can be advanced. One possibility is the existence of localised technological spillovers such
as those studied by Jacobs (1969) and by Henderson and et al., (1995). For instance, the pro x i m i t y
of numerous firms might enable the innovative sector greater scope for observing and analysing the
p roduction process and thereby facilitate the creation of new production processes. Silicon Valley is
the most successful example of the effect of such interactions between producers and innovators in a
p a rticular domain, that of information technology (1). Nort h e rn Italian regions are other examples of
the force of such localised spillovers. Also, if the innovative sector uses manufacturing sector inputs,
its concentration will enable transaction costs and hence the cost of innovation to be reduced. In this
case, the positive externality arising from spatial concentration is pecuniary, operating through an
e ffect on prices (see Martin and Ottaviano 1996, for such a model).
A further type of externality comes from the fact that firms (and in general owners of mobile factors) do
not take into account the welfare of other agents when they choose where to locate. In part i c u l a r, they
do not take into account the welfare of those agents who are immobile. The reason is that they do not
get the whole benefits linked to their location decisions. Here the market failure is due ultimately to the
fact that certain agents do not move. If no congestion effects appear, then full concentration would not
c reate any problem. Hence, if this were the only market failure, public policies that promote mobility of
workers should be enough to respond with problems caused by agglomeration. Indeed, the fact that
mobility (both between regions of a given country and between countries) is much lower in Europe than
in the US explains why the location of economic activities has become a more important policy issue
on this side of the Atlantic. From the policy point of view, housing and tax policies that facilitate the
mobility of workers should there f o re be re g a rded as part of the regional toolkit. The fact that re g i o n s
can be specialised in specific industries also suggests that low inter-sectoral mobility of workers adds to
the welfare cost of spatial concentration. This means that policies that facilitate inter-sectoral mobility
such as education and training policies in poor regions should be re i n f o rced. 
In a recent paper, however, Matsuyama and Takahashi (1998), show that the freedom to move can
in fact be self-defeating in certain circumstances. They show, in fact, that agents would be better off
if their freedom to move were taken away. The reason is that as agents move to the agglomeration
in pursuit of a better life because of the diversity of services and goods provided there, the pro d u c t i o n
of the goods from the poor region (now in “the middle of nowhere”) declines and the standard of
living of all agents drops. Here, the market failure is the absence of co-ordination between the
1) The work of Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson, (1993) shows that the citation and use of patents is very localized. This is
very strong evidence that knowledge spillovers are themselves very localized.
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d i ff e rent agents rather than immobility per se. Another market failure that is not solved by the mobility
of agents, and can even be aggravated by it, is congestion externalities. 
F i n a l l y, space itself can be at the origin of market failures because it leads to imperfect competition. The
reason, first analysed in the context of the Hotelling model, is that distance between producers gives
f i rms a relative market power over consumers who are located nearby. In this case, as transaction costs
go down, competition between firms is re i n f o rced and firms will react by diff e rentiating their pro d u c t s
along non-geographical characteristics. This important insight has been analysed by Gabszewicz and
Thisse (1986) and Scotchmer and Thisse (1992). Some of its implications for regional policies may not
have been entirely exploited yet. If regional policies reduce transaction costs, then they take away the
monopolistic power of firms that is based on distance, and increase the incentive to regain monopolistic
power through product diff e rentiation. This latter type of diff e rentiation may have some positive impact
on welfare if consumers value diversity.
3. Equity considerations
What is the impact of economic geography on equity, and can regional policies be justified on this
ground? This depends very much upon: the relative distortion effects of regional policies and of
redistributive fiscal policy on individuals; the mobility of factors (capital and labour); and, the extent
of inequality among individuals in the population of both the poor and the rich regions.
To make equity considerations a possible justification for regional policy, we must assume first that
non-distortionary lump sum transfers are not possible. Otherwise, if a region experiences a
delocation of its economic activities and could be compensated in this way by another region, then
the question of regional inequalities would be easy to solve. The standard view is however that such
redistribution is indeed not possible due, in particular, to information problems. In that case it can
be argued that regional policies are less distortionary than the income taxes needed to compensate
individual losers of changes in economic geography. However, regional policies add a
supplementary distortion in the sense that they alter economic geography through the location
decisions of firms. In recent papers (Martin 1999a and 1999b), I have argued that a trade-off exists
between equity and efficiency at the spatial level so that public policies which, through taxation and
subsidies, induce firms to relocate in poor regions may reduce the overall efficiency of the economy.
An indication of these arguments is given below.
The spatial equity problem also depends very much on income inequality in the population. The
m o re inequality among the individuals, especially between workers and capital owners, the more
acute the problem of spatial inequality will be. This can be seen in a simple model with two
regions  and  two  factors,  mobile capital and  immobile  agents such  as  in Martin and Rogers
(1995). Workers of the monopolistic manufacturing sector and of the perfect competition sector
e a rn the same nominal wage in the two regions. This is because the goods produced in the perf e c t
competition sector are traded with no costs so that nominal wage rates are equalised. What
d e t e rmines their welfare is their real wage which also depends on the number of firms in each
region. Workers in the region with the highest number of firms gain because they pay lower
transaction costs as many of the goods are produced locally. This decreases the price index and
t h e re f o re increases the real wage in that re g i o n .
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Facilitating capital mobility between the two regions, for example by eliminating legal barriers to plant
c l o s u res, have a diff e rent impact on the welfare of the diff e rent agents. If firms relocate from the poor to
the rich region, the price index will increase in the poor region and decrease in the rich region. However
the re t u rn (profits in the monopolistic sector) to capital will increase in the poor region and decrease in
the rich region. The reason is that as firms move out of the poor region, local competition will decre a s e
and the opposite will occur in the rich region. Another way to say this is that firms from the poor re g i o n
will move out if profits are higher in the rich region up to the point where re t u rns are equalised in the two
regions. Unambiguously welfare of workers in the poor region decreases: their nominal wage is tied by
factor equalisation due to free trade in the perfectly competitive sector, but the price index increases so
that their real wage decreases. The inverse happens for workers in the rich region so that inequality
between workers of the two regions increases when firms are free to choose location.
The situation for capital owners is more ambivalent. The nominal income of capital owners in the
poor region rises. The relocation of some firms to the rich region lowers competition and incre a s e s
the profits of the firms that they own. However, as consumers, they may loose because the price index
i n c reases in the poor region. Following the methodology of Martin and Rogers (1995), it is possible
to show that capital owners in the poor region will gain with relocation if transaction costs are low
enough and if the extent of competition (measured by the inverse of the degree of elasticity of
substitution between varieties in the monopolistic sector) is not too high. The exact reverse result holds
for capital owners in the rich region. However, because the nominal income of capital owners in the
poor region rises with free relocation, the inequality between workers and capital owners in the poor
region (measured in terms of real income or welfare) will always increase when firms choose fre e l y
their location. This may be an important argument in favour of regional policies. However, note that
the concentration process in the rich region will, by the same reasoning, decrease inequality between
workers and capital owners in that region because as competition increases, profits will decrease (to
equalise those in the poor region by an arbitrage process) as well as incomes of capital owners. This
implies that regional policies that would tend to impede this relocation process will benefit immobile
workers of the poor region but will harm immobile workers of the rich region. It would decre a s e
inequality in the poor region and increase it in the rich region. The equity motive behind re g i o n a l
policies is thus not as straightforw a rd as it seems because it re q u i res a choice on reducing one type
of inequality at the expense of another type of inequality.
Another important result is that the extent to which inequalities will be increased by letting the concentration
p rocess free will depend crucially on the distribution of factors of production. The more unequal the
distribution  of  mobile  capital  in  the  population  the  more  the  concentration  process  will  exacerbate
inequalities in the population. The reason is that if immobile workers can relocate some capital, then the
w e l f a re loss due to higher a price index when firms relocate outside the region will in part be compensated
by an increase in their income from the higher re t u rn to capital outside the poor region. 
Equity considerations are important for analysing regional policies. However, the question: “Do re g i o n a l
policies decrease inequality between poor and rich regions?”, is not the same as: “Do regional po l i c i e s
i m p rove welfare of agents in the poor regions?”. To see this we will use two simple examples.
In a similar framework as the one described above, suppose that we look at the welfare impact of
a decrease of transaction costs between a poor and a rich region. This could be the result, for
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example, of building a new highway. The impact on the two regions of decreasing transaction costs
in this way is modelled in more detail in Box 1. In this model an improvement of infrastructure
facilitating trade leads to relocation of firms from the poor to the rich region. Firms can now better
exploit economies of scale in the larger market and still export to the poor region as trade is
facilitated between the two regions (2). Hence, if we were to look at regional GDP we would see
a fall in the poor region and an increase in the rich one. From that point of view, one could interpret
this policy as increasing inequalities between the two regions.
But what is the impact on welfare of a worker in the poor and the rich region? Lower transaction
costs affect welfare in two diff e rent ways. The direct effect, lower costs for imported goods, is always
positive for the poor region (3). At the same time, industrial location from the poor to rich region has
a negative indirect impact on welfare in the poor region as more goods must be imported at a cost.
In this particular model, the direct benefit is always greater than the indirect loss for the poor re g i o n .
Hence, the example shows that, even though on e q u i t y g rounds a policy of lowering transaction costs
may not be called for, it can be defended on the grounds that it increases welfare of the poor re g i o n .
A c o n t r a r i o, even though new economic geography insists on the concentration effects of lower
transaction costs, its normative implications are certainly not to promote higher transaction costs.
N e v e rtheless, it is true in such models that if a planner could change economic geography, that is,
could choose the number of firms in each region, equity considerations would entail to increase the
number of firms in the poor region at the expense of the rich region (this again assumes that no lump
sum transfers are possible as these may dominate such a distort i o n a ry policy). However, this re s u l t
itself is not general. Martin and Ottaviano (1999) show that the existence of localised technology
spillovers introduces an ambiguity. In this case, higher concentration in the rich region increases the
extent of technology spillovers (firms being close learn more from each other) which increases the
g rowth rate and there f o re benefits the poor region. Martin and Ottaviano (1999) re p o rt that the net
e ffect on welfare in the poor region depends in particular on the level of transaction costs, the
i m p o rtance of localised spillovers and on the inequality in capital endowments between the two
regions. When transaction costs between the two regions are low, the positive effect of concentration
will dominate because in this case, the fact that more goods have to be imported from the rich re g i o n
is not very important. The net effect of concentration is also positive when spillovers are stro n g
enough. Finally, if the poor region has initially little capital (or the inequality in capital endowments
is high), then the positive effect will again dominate. This is because higher growth decreases pro f i t s
of existing firms due to stronger competition: as the poor region has little capital the negative eff e c t
of lower profits is weak and the positive effect of stronger competition is important. Hence, the
existence of localised spillovers, which induces a trade-off between regional equity and eff i c i e n c y,
may be an important factor in choosing the type of regional policies to implement.
To  summarise, we  have  seen that a policy that reduces transaction costs between  regions may
i m p rove welfare in the poor region even though it induces more spatial concentration and inequality.
M o re o v e r, regional policy that induces firms to move to the poorer location (for example thro u g h
subsidies) may not be always welfare improving for the poor region, especially if spillovers are
2) See Combes and Lafourcade (1999) for a study that shows that the reduction of transaction costs in France has indeed
led to more industrial concentration. 
3) This is an overstatement because the infrastructure must be paid for. Implicitly, we assume that infrastructure projects are
paid for by the rich region.
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s t rong, inter- regional transaction costs are low and inequality in capital endowments between re g i o n s
is high. If one believes that this characterises the European situation, then regional policies that focus
on reducing transactions can be legitimate, but not for the reasons that are usually advanced by
policy makers. Reducing transaction costs between regions will induce more concentration, but will
weaken the detrimental effects of spatial concentration. It will increase efficiency and growth and
t h e re f o re improve welfare in the poorest regions. However, if the ultimate goal of regional policies
is not only to improve welfare, but also to decrease inequalities between European regions, then
policies that focus on human capital (education and training) would be more appro p r i a t e .
Box 1. A model of lowering transactions costs
The important assumption of this model (see Martin and Rogers, 1995, for further details) is that the
manufacturing sector experiences increasing returns due to the fact that each firm requires a fixed
amount of capital. Because capital is perfectly mobile, firms can choose to locate production in either
a rich ( r ) or poor ( p ) region. Kr and Kp are the respective stocks of capital owned by the rich and
the poor region and Lr and Lp are the number of immobile workers in those regions. We assume that
Kr>Kp and Lr>Lp. There are iceberg transaction costs ô on trade on manufacturing goods between
the two regions and ò = ô1 -ó<1, is a usual transformation (ó is the elasticity of substitution between
goods in the monopolistic sector) so that an increase in ò implies an improvement in infrastru c t u re facilitating
trade between the two regions. In equilibrium, the number of firms locating production in each region is:
(1)   nr =
Kr+Kp (
Lr-Lp .ò); np =
Kr+Kp (
Lp-Lr .ò) Lr+Lp        1-ò Lr+Lp        1-ò
This equilibrium location is found by  equating supplies and  demands on goods markets and by an
arbitrage condition that re q u i res that the profit of a unit of capital be equal in both regions so that no
relocation can be profitable. Equation (1) shows that more firms locate in the rich region than in the poor
one. It is easy to check that an increase in ò leads to relocation of firms from the poor to the rich re g i o n .
Welfare is given by the equations:
(2)  Vr = C (nr+ np.ò ) ó-1
á
;  Vp = C (np+ nr.ò ) ó-1
á
where C is a constant and á is the share of manufacturing goods in the utility function. These equations
just say that welfare depends on industrial location (nr and np) and on transaction costs. Because ò is
less than 1 (some of the goods are lost in the process of transporting them between the two regions),
welfare increases with the number of firms located in one's own region (as nr+ np is constant and equal
to the total capital stock, Kr+Kp). 
Using equations (1) and (2), welfare in the poor region is:




( 1+ò ) ó-1
á
Lr+Lp             
Hence, even though lower transaction costs (higher ò) induces industrial relocation from the poor to the
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4. Demand and supply effects of regional policies
Regional policies that finance infrastructure projects have both demand and supply effects. The
demand effects are mostly short-term effects whereas supply effects are more medium- to long-term.
The demand effects of infrastructure projects such as roads, highways and other heavy
infrastructures that are often financed through regional funds are quite clear. With a simple
Keynesian framework in mind, it is easy to understand that this localised spending increases
aggregate demand in the region. The effect is both direct and indirect through the Keynesian
multiplier. The effect will be stronger the higher the unemployment rate and the lower the utilisation
rate of factors of production such as capital in the region. Of course, the demand effects are not
permanent, and once the infrastructure projects are over, the demand effects are reversed.
However, they are certainly the most visible and the easiest to analyse and quantify. Indeed, the
European Commission (1999) insists on these effects and use a Keynesian econometric model at
the level of the country to quantify them. They find that for the period from 1989 to 1999 the
contribution of the EU transfers has been to increase the average growth rate by a maximum of 1
percentage point (Greece and Portugal during the period from 1994 to 1999) and a minimum of
0.3 percentage points (Spain during the period from 1989 to 1993).
These results are very difficult to interpret for two reasons. First, they measure at best the upper limit
of the effect of regional policies. The reason is that they attribute any gap to the past trend of growth
to the effect of regional policies. But we know that during this period where the integration process
was very strong the convergence process was also very strong due to large private capital inflows
to these countries (except for Greece). These inflows can well be explained in a simple neo-classical
model with capital movements and convergence. Second, these studies look only at the impact on
countries and not regions. This also is problematic because several studies (such as Neven and
Gouyette, 1994) insist on the fact that convergence in Europe occurs between countries, but not
between regions. De la Fuente and Vives (1995), for instance, building on the work of Esteban
(1994), suggest that around half the income inequality between the regions of the EU is accounted
for by domestic inequality between regions within individual countries. Thus, during the 1980s and
1990s per capita income differentials have been narrowing between countries, but widening
between regions within individual countries (Martin, 1998). The EU studies provide very little
information on the impact of regional policies on regional inequalities in Europe.
Furthermore, in the context of regional policies, it is more important to study the supply effects. As
the earlier discussion has revealed, the long-term supply effects may be exactly opposite to the short-
term demand effects. The dynamics of this evolution can be seen with a traditional aggregate
demand/aggregate supply graph. In Figure 1 we illustrate this for a poor region that receives funds
to finance infrastructure connections with a richer region. In the short-term, the aggregate supply
curve in the poor region may be almost horizontal because of slack capacity and because some
capital will move to the poor region when aggregate demand increases. Hence, the new
i n f r a s t ru c t u re spending has a high positive short - run impact on output (output goes from point 1 to 2).
However, this is temporary. The long-term effect is uncertain: The economic geography message is
that the reduction of transaction costs may induce firms to concentrate in the rich region so that
aggregate supply in the poor region is reduced (in which case output goes to point 3).
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The distinction of demand and supply effects is also important for political economy reasons.
Because the demand effects are short-term effects and they are most important for heavy
infrastructure, and because the political horizon is also a short-term one, the strong bias in favour
of heavy transport infrastructure in regional policies can be explained easily. 
5. Conclusion
We have seen that public policies aimed at altering economic geography and regional
development have multiple and sometimes contradictory impacts. The reason is that economic
geography is key for many economic issues. It is important as a determinant of welfare, inequalities,
productivity, growth and innovation. Moreover, economic geography is itself endogenous and
public policies that influence transaction costs, innovation, or mobility of factors will change the
location decisions of economic agents. Because of these potential self-reinforcing mechanisms at
work, analysed earlier by Faini (1983) and Krugman (1991), it is also likely that regional policies
have compound effects. If the dynamics of economic geography can be interpreted as one
equilibrium loosing suddenly its stability at the benefit of an another equilibrium, this implies that
regional policies will be most of the time useless, though extremely powerful in some rare
circumstances. If agglomeration is due to a self-sustaining mechanism, through vertical linkages for
example, then giving a small advantage to the poor region (for example through subsidies) will in
no case alter the stability of the equilibrium. However, in the case where a new economic
geography is in the process of being made, because of some drastic exogenous change in the
economic environment or because new activities are created, then public policies may be the
exogenous force that gives a key advantage to one region or to one stable equilibrium out of many
stable and possible equilibria.
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It may be that the process of European integration is exactly such a moment where previously stable
equilibria are redefined and where new equilibria emerge. The experience of call centres in France
is also revealing. This is a rather new activity which by itself does not require to be close to a
specific region. The city of Troyes in Champagne has been relatively successful to attract call centres
by a specific training policy and a real estate policy aimed at favouring this activity. To a certain
extent the example of Brittany with some information technologies linked to telecommunications is
similar; training policy was again a key element. If, indeed, regional policies have very little impact
most of the time and a strong one in some very specific circumstances, then policy mistakes are
going to be numerous because the information requirement is too severe. This does not imply that
regional policies have no use, but that these compound effects should be carefully integrated in the
choices made.
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